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ABSTRACT: The major argument for capping the exemption of health insurance benefits 
from income tax is that doing so will generate significant revenue that can be used to 
finance an expansion of health coverage. This analysis finds that given the state of insur-
ance markets and current variations in premiums, limiting the current exemption could 
adversely affect individuals who are already at high risk of losing their health coverage. 
Evidence suggests that capping the exemption for employment-based health insurance 
could disproportionately affect workers in small firms, older workers, and wage-earners in 
industries with high expected claims costs. To avoid putting many families at increased 
health and financial risk, and to avoid undermining employer-sponsored group coverage, 
any consideration of a cap would have to be combined with coverage for all, changes in 
insurance market rules, and shared responsibility for financing.
                    
OvERvIEw
Eliminating or capping the exemption, or exclusion, of employer-based health 
insurance from personal and Social Security taxes has often been described as 
progressive tax policy, and as one way to raise revenue for an expansion of cov-
erage.1 This issue brief assesses some of the implications of proposals to change 
the tax treatment of employer-sponsored health plans by reviewing current 
sources of variation in insurance premiums. It also uses recent data on the benefits 
of the current income-based tax exemption in order to examine the tax incidence 
effect—the change in tax as a share of income—of eliminating the exemption.
Our analysis finds that given the state of insurance markets and present vari-
ations in premiums, limiting the current exemption could adversely affect indi-
viduals who are already at high risk of losing their health coverage. Evidence 
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suggests that capping the exemption for employment-
based health insurance could disproportionately affect 
workers in small firms, older workers, and wage-earn-
ers in high-risk industries (those with high expected 
claims costs, such as farming and construction). 
Without adjusting for cost of living, such a cap would 
also disproportionately affect those working in high-
cost geographic areas. 
Claims that the current tax treatment of health 
insurance benefits is regressive are typically based on 
changes in absolute tax dollars rather than changes in 
tax rates. In economics, tax increases are defined as 
“progressive” if they represent a greater share of 
income for higher-income households. Defined as a 
share of income, the value of the current tax exemp-
tion is larger for low- and middle-income households 
with employer-provided coverage than for high-
income households. Elimination of the exemption 
would thus introduce a much greater increase in fed-
eral tax liability for households with incomes below 
$50,000 than for those with incomes above $200,000, 
and increase the tax rate of lower-income households 
with employer coverage more than those higher-
income households. Therefore, a cap on the tax 
exemption of health benefits would represent a regres-
sive—not progressive—change in tax policy.
CAPPIng THE ExEmPTIOn: REvEnuE fOR 
fInAnCIng A COvERAgE ExPAnSIOn
The major argument for capping the exemption of 
health insurance benefits from income tax is that doing 
so will generate significant revenue that can be used to 
finance an expansion of health coverage. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the 
existing personal income and payroll tax exemptions 
for employee health benefits resulted in $246 billion of 
forgone federal revenue in 2007.2 These exemptions 
translate into tax savings that are divided among work-
ers and their employers. Projections by the CBO and 
congressional Joint Committee on Taxation show that 
workers with employment-based health benefits will 
save roughly $145 billion to $175 billion in individual 
income taxes in FY2009, while both employees and 
businesses will save approximately $100 billion in 
payroll tax.3 Five-year (2008–12) estimates of uncol-
lected revenue run from $799 billion to $835 billion. 
The CBO further estimates that limiting the 
exemption for employer-provided health benefits to 
the 75th percentile of health insurance premiums, and 
indexing the cap to inflation, would save $452.1 bil-
lion over the 10-year period 2009–18.4 In examining a 
range of potential revenue sources in the context of 
comprehensive health reform, a recent Commonwealth 
Fund report analyzed the revenue effect of capping the 
tax exemption at the premium level of a nationwide 
benchmark health plan offered to everyone within a 
national health insurance exchange implemented along 
with broad insurance market reforms (e.g., community 
rating and pooling of health risks).5 Taxing health ben-
efits in excess of the benchmark plan premiums of 
$3,000 for single coverage and $9,000 for family cov-
erage was projected to generate $344 billion over the 
2010–2019 period. Phasing down the tax exemption 
for workers with incomes between $250,000 and 
$500,000 and eliminating the exemption above 
$500,000 were projected to generate $24 billion during 
that same period. 
COnCERnS wITH CAPS: PREmIum 
vARIATIOn By fIRm SIzE, REgIOn,  
And RISk
While eliminating or limiting the exemption for 
employer-provided health benefits would generate a 
significant amount of federal revenue, any change to 
the current tax policy must be carefully assessed for 
potential unintended consequences. Employment-
related group insurance is currently the primary source 
of coverage for the under-65 population, insuring two-
thirds of working-age adults, and the tax exemption 
for such coverage has helped support the pooling of 
health risks and group health insurance.
Some believe that the current exemption should be 
limited to create incentives for individuals to select 
less-comprehensive insurance benefits or more cost-
effective health plans. The concern is that the tax sub-
sidy for premiums may, at the margin, undermine 
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incentives to choose higher-value, lower-cost health 
plans.6 This view often assumes that health insurance 
benefits in plans with premium costs that are above the 
national average are “excessive.”
In truth, however, many so-called “gold-plated” 
health benefit premiums are high only because insur-
ance costs vary according to the size of the firm, the 
geographic region in which it is located, and the com-
position of the employer’s risk pool.7 In today’s insur-
ance markets, establishing a universal cap will have a 
disproportionate impact on workers in small firms, 
high-cost areas, and expensive risk pools.8 
Firm size. Without economies of scale and the ability 
to pool risk broadly, small businesses tend to pay 
higher premiums, despite having less-comprehensive 
benefits. Recent analysis of Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey (MEPS) data for employers, conducted 
by Paul Fronstin of the Employee Benefit Research 
Institute (EBRI), shows that the average total premium 
for employee-only coverage in a business with fewer 
than 10 workers was $4,498 in 2006, about 10 percent 
greater than the average premium in firms with more 
than 1,000 workers (Exhibit 1). Research by Jon Gabel 
demonstrates that this excess cost is not going toward 
additional “gold-plated” coverage.9 Overall, the higher 
average premiums paid by small businesses typically 
buy less-comprehensive benefit packages with much 
higher deductibles and cost-sharing. Capping the tax 
exemption at the “average” premium could thus dis-
proportionately increase taxes for employees of small 
firms, irrespective of their benefit package.
Geographic location. Premiums also vary by where 
employees live. Analysis by EBRI’s Fronstin of the 
Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and 
Educational Trust Employer Health Benefits Annual 
Survey shows that, in 2008, the average total health 
insurance premium for family coverage in the 
Northeast was $13,656, while coverage for a family in 
the South averaged $12,252 (Exhibit 2). Furthermore, 
premiums for MediGap policies with the same benefits 
also vary widely—an indication that underlying health 
care markets and costs, rather than benefit design, are 
driving premium variations.
A uniform cap at the national average would thus 
increase taxes in higher-cost states and regions. Even 
if policies were put in place to moderate costs in 
expensive health care markets where there is evidence 
of inefficient or wasteful care, without adjusting for 
the cost of living the cap would still disproportionately 
affect workers living in high-cost areas.
Risk pool. The composition of an employer’s risk pool 
is directly correlated with the employees’ coverage 
premium. Through the process of medical underwrit-
ing, insurance companies charge higher premiums to 
groups with larger expected claims costs, resulting in 
premiums that vary by age and health.10 Individuals 
Exhibit 1. Average Total Employee-Only Premium at 
Private-Sector Establishments, by Firm Size, 2006
Data: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.
Source: P. Fronstin, Capping the Tax Exclusion for Employment-Based Health Coverage: 
Implications for Employers and Workers (Washington, D.C.: Employee Benefit Research 
Institute, Jan. 2009).
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Exhibit 2. Average Total Family Premium at Private-Sector 
Establishments, by Geographic Region, 2008
Data: Kaiser/HRET 2008.
Source: P. Fronstin, Capping the Tax Exclusion for Employment-Based Health Coverage: 
Implications for Employers and Workers (Washington, D.C.: Employee Benefit Research 
Institute, Jan. 2009).
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employed by a firm where workers are sicker or older 
than the norm, or where all workers face higher health 
risks, are likely to face higher premiums than individu-
als insured in a lower-risk group. A non-targeted cap 
on the employer-provided health benefits exemption 
would result in additional taxes for workers in high-
cost groups, even though their benefits may be equiva-
lent to, or worse than, those received by their counter-
parts in lower-cost groups.
Without substantial market reforms, a uniform cap 
would have the unintended consequence of differen-
tially taxing benefits for workers in small firms, old 
and high-risk groups, and high-cost geographic areas. 
Although it would be possible to adjust for some of 
these factors, the technical challenge of varying limits 
in the tax code and the complications encountered 
while attempting to value health benefits under now-
repealed Section 89 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
may give policymakers pause.11
REgRESSIvE COnSEquEnCES Of 
ELImInATIng THE CuRREnT ExEmPTIOn
Eliminating the current tax exemption for employer-
provided health benefits would also have important, 
often overlooked regressive consequences for low- and 
middle-income individuals and families. While the 
average tax subsidy for health benefits in absolute dol-
lars is larger for workers higher on the income ladder, 
the subsidy amounts to nearly 10 percent of after-tax 
income for very low-wage workers and only 1 percent 
of after-tax income for workers earning more than 
$200,000 a year (Exhibits 3 and 4).12 Although it is 
true that low-income workers are far less likely than 
high-income workers to have employment-based 
health insurance, the value of the current tax treatment 
is high as a share of income for low- and middle-wage 
workers that have such health benefits.13 Further, tax 
changes in the context of health reform that requires 
employers to provide health insurance to workers or 
contribute to a fund would result in nearly all workers 
receiving coverage from their employers.
Employers typically pay the same premium for 
health insurance for all eligible workers, irrespective 
of income level, although payments vary based on 
whether the plan is for single or family coverage. Over 
the past decade, premiums have generally increased 
far faster than wages.14 As a result, employer payments 
for health insurance premiums represent a substantial 
share of total compensation for low-and middle-
income employees and a much lower share for upper-
income employees and corporate executives.15 Thus, 
the federal tax exemption for employer-paid premiums 
is of particular value to low-wage and middle-income 
workers and their families.
Currently, premium payments for employer- 
sponsored plans are exempt from Social Security taxes 
as well as federal income taxes. This exemption is 
especially valuable to low- and middle-income 
employees, because all of their income is subject to 
Social Security taxes. As of 2009, employees pay a  
Exhibit 3. ESI Tax Subsidies in Absolute Dollars and as a 
Percentage of After-tax Income, for Tax Units with ESI, 2004 
Data: Tax Policy Center calculations based on HIPSM database.
Source: L. Burman, B. Garrett, and S. Khitatrakun, “The Tax Code, Employer-Sponsored 
Insurance and the Distribution of Tax Subsidies,” in H. J. Aaron and L. E. Burman (eds.), 
Using Taxes to Reform Health Insurance: Pitfalls and Promises, Brookings Institution, 2008.
  Subsidy as a Percentage
Income Average Subsidy of After-Tax Income
Less than $10,000 $580 9.7%
$10,000–$20,000 $1,168 8.4%
$20,000–$30,000 $1,622 7.6%
$30,000–$40,000 $1,621 5.8%
$40,000–$50,000 $1,733 5.0%
$50,000–$75,000 $1,960 4.4%
$75,000–$100,000 $2,298 3.9%
$100,000–$200,000 $2,690 3.2%
$200,000 and over $2,943 1.0%
All $1,945 3.5%
Exhibit 4. Current ESI Tax Subsidies in Absolute Dollars and as a 
Percentage of After-tax Income, for Tax Units with ESI, 2004
Data: Tax Policy Center calculations based on HIPSM database.
Source: L. Burman, B. Garrett, and S. Khitatrakun, “The Tax Code, Employer-Sponsored 
Insurance and the Distribution of Tax Subsidies” in H. J. Aaron and L. E. Burman (eds.), 
Using Taxes to Reform Health Insurance: Pitfalls and Promises, Brookings Institution, 2008.
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6.2 percent FICA tax for Social Security and employ-
ers pay an additional 6.2 percent on incomes up to 
$106,800. Employees with incomes below this thresh-
old would therefore pay additional FICA tax (as well 
as additional income tax) on employer-paid premium 
amounts if these were not exempt.
Eliminating the health benefits exemption would 
substantially increase federal tax liability for those 
lower- and middle-income families who receive health 
benefits through their jobs. Preliminary analysis by the 
Urban Institute and Brookings Institution indicates that 
workers with employer-sponsored insurance who earn 
between $30,000 and $40,000 per year would see total 
federal tax increases of 48 percent. Eliminating the 
exemption for workers with employer-provided health 
benefits who earn between $40,000 and $50,000 and 
between $50,000 and $75,000 would increase tax lia-
bility by 28 percent and 20 percent, respectively 
(Exhibit 5). 
The resulting total change in average federal 
income tax rates—defined as (after-repeal tax liabil-
ity)/(after-repeal income) – (baseline tax liability)/
(baseline income)—would also be greater for low-
wage workers who have employer-paid health benefits. 
The average income tax rates are projected to increase 
by 5 percent to 13 percent of income for families with 
incomes below $30,000 (12.6 percent below $20,000) 
and 1 percent to 2 percent for families with incomes 
between $30,000 and $50,000. Meanwhile, those with 
incomes in excess of $200,000 will see an average 
change in tax rates of only 0.1 percent. 
COnCLuSIOn: COSTS And COnSEquEnCES
Changes to the federal income tax treatment of health 
insurance benefits were a feature of many leading 
health reform bills in the 110th Congress and are likely 
to continue to be proposed in the 111th.16 While  
modifications may bring significant increases in fed-
eral revenue that could be used for coverage expan-
sion, any change to the current tax policy must be 
carefully targeted.
As shown in this brief, high premiums are not an 
indication that insurance coverage is excessive or that 
a plan is “gold-plated.” Moreover, it was shown that 
establishing a universal cap on the tax exemption for 
health benefits would have a disproportionate impact 
on workers in small firms, high-cost areas, and expen-
sive risk pools. To avoid putting sicker, older, and low- 
or modest-income families at increased health and 
financial risk, and to avoid potentially undermining 
current employer-sponsored pooled-risk group cover-
age, any consideration of a cap would have to be  
combined with coverage for all, changes in insurance 
market rules, and shared responsibility for financing. 
In the context of market rules that require community 
rating and broadly pooled risk, a cap pegged to a 
benchmark-quality health plan could potentially avoid 
disproportionately increasing taxes on employees 
working for small businesses or on employee groups 
with a higher health risk. And by requiring employers 
either to provide health coverage or to contribute to an 
insurance trust, the risk that a cap might unravel finan-
cial support for health benefits could be avoided.
Still, this source of revenue for financing a cover-
age expansion would continue to be more regressive 
that other potential sources. Even with the implemen-
tation of comprehensive insurance reform, it would  
be important to recognize that changing the current  
tax treatment of employer-provided health benefits 
will have consequences for low-income individuals 
and families. Viewed from the perspective of tax 
increases as a share of income, eliminating the tax 
Exhibit 5. Effect of Ending Current ESI Tax Subsidies,
for Tax Units with ESI, 2004 
Note: Percentage increase in total income taxes is change in tax liability divided by baseline 
tax liability. Data on percentage increase is not shown for tax units with less than $30,000 in 
income due to very low baseline tax liability. Change in average income tax rates is new tax 
divided by new income minus baseline tax divided by baseline income.
Data: Tax Policy Center calculations based on HIPSM database.
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exemption for employee health benefits would be a 
regressive—not progressive—tax policy change. The 
current exemption represents a larger tax break as a 
percentage of income for low-income households with 
employer coverage and a smaller tax break for higher-
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income households. Eliminating it would thus increase 
the tax burden on low-income households, as a percent-
age of income and as a percentage of current tax liabil-
ity, more than it would for higher-income households. 
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